The Fog of More in Law Enforcement Training
Law enforcement officers work in volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and threatening environments (VUCA-T). There are two complimentary frameworks related to operating in this type of environment, von Clausewitz’s “Fog of War,1” and Sager’s “Fog of More.2” Understanding these concepts is essential for instructors developing effective training curriculum and preparing students for real-world events.
The Fog of War represents the uncertainty and confusion found on the battlefield due to conflicting and incomplete information. Clausewitz stated1 “…three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” This Fog of War is also complicated by the potentially overwhelming emotional perception of danger and suffering, which may result in a “psychological fog.3” This applies to law enforcement where officers are forced to make split-second decisions in “…tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving events.4” Officers deal with subjects in situations with innumerable variables and imperfect knowledge of subject intent, while making life-or-death decisions.
Although the Fog of More has roots in cybersecurity, it similarly describes the potential hesitation,5 or paralysis, which can occur when officers are overloaded within a VUCA-T situation. This hesitation may be impacted by unpredictable subjects, environmental conditions, policies, laws, ineffective training, tactics, and tool selection. As technology improves and is integrated into law enforcement responses, such as drones, weapon mounted optics, artificial intelligence, real time data, and more; have these technologies created additional layers of complexity and potential for issues?6 All the while the subject is not necessarily bound by these same issue.
These Fog concepts can be merged into core manifestations. Officers may have incomplete information about the nature of the event they are engaged in. The event may change faster than the officer can process critical information. Communication problems may occur between the officer, subject, and others which can exacerbate uncertainty and volatility. Consideration must be given to the physical and psychological impacts on the officer. Instructors, administrators, and experts must push back against unrealistic, superhuman expectations being placed on officer performance. Officers may be forced to deal with complex, overlapping, and at times competing use of force guidelines and laws. Additionally, they must simultaneously consider de-escalation or force escalation protocols, equipment options, appropriate tactics, and relevant legal standards.
The conflict between legal frameworks, poorly developed policy, a lack of effective and realistic training, sparce training resources, instructor knowledge and professionalism, has a high probability of creating confusion in the officer when it manifests in the VUCA-T environment. This probability of confusion may increase cognitive load and create delays in response. Policies and procedures must be pressure tested through effective and realistic training to identify gaps, conflicts, improper definition, and realistic application prior to associated problems manifesting in real-world situations. Simply stated, the combination of these factors between environmental conditions, subject actions, law, policy, tactics, less lethal and lethal options, can create decision trees too complex for split-second scenarios- the Fog of More. As a result, an officer’s performance will assuredly suffer.6
To combat the Fog, instructional design must include contextually relevant scenarios. The first time a student engages in a crisis should not be when they are in a real crisis, but in a controlled, safe environment where mistakes may be learned from. Instructors need to know what block, siloed, interleaved, random, variable, and spaced practice is. They need to learn where these practice methods are appropriate, but at the end of the day, students must regularly train in contextually relevant scenarios. These training models are useful in the appropriate time and space depending on the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the student.
As a profession, we need to move beyond legacy training paradigms of the past. This includes understanding that:
· Training should look messy and frustrating where mistakes are allowed to occur and are learned from
· Scenarios do not need to be complex, taking hours to implement and demand immense resources
· Scenarios can be thin slices of complex problems which build on each other toward the larger whole
· Scenarios should be contextually driven from notification of a situation (dispatched, citizen notification, officer observation) toward the desired resolution of the problem or task7
· Training should safely reflect real-world applications complete with VUCA-T conditions.
· Training should prioritize task completion over techniques
· Developing increasingly complex versions of the whole task8
· Understanding the relationships between the person, setting (environment), and the context
· Properly constructed training will pressure test policies and procedures and their applicability to real-world situations
· Incorporate dynamic changes which students must adapt to, including time pressure, conflicting information, and multiple simultaneous demands on their attention
· Continually challenging training programs which do not effectively replicate real-world conditions
The Fog represents fundamental challenges in law enforcement judgement and decision-making. Through these concepts, instructors may be able to develop more effective curriculum to prepare officers for the VUCA-T environment they will endure in the field. The goal is not to eliminate the “Fog” because that is impossible. The goal is to equip officers with the mindset, tactics, and tools necessary to function in these foggy situations. We must acknowledge and implement training which equips officers to navigate these situations with imperfect information and wide ranging responses to protect public and officer safety, while mitigating unnecessary harm.
Reference
1. Von Clausewitz, C. (1976). On War. [Kriege, V. trans.]. Princeton University Press. [original publication c. 1816-1830] (p. 101).
2. Sager, T. (n.d.). Cybersecurity at Scale: Piercing the Fog of More. Center for Internet Security. Retrieved https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/cyber-at-scale-piercing-the-fog-of-more
3. Von Clausewitz, C. (1976). On War. [Kriege, V. trans.]. Princeton University Press. [original publication c. 1816-1830] (p. 108).
4. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
5. Paape, J. (2018, November 7). Cutting Through the Fog of More. Cyber Defense Magazine. Retrieved https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/cutting-through-the-fog-of-more/?__cf_chl_tk=HTjWA.khUlSKucUVVDNIKamVYy49v0fkvvKsLhoTRxU-1747966275-1.0.1.1-OcWjo1cp4M70cQSAJlAZnC3G76n62YkBBPMGvdYVNhA
6. Colon, M. (2018, May 3). How the “Fog of More” Bogs Down Infosec Pros. SC Media. Retrieved https://www.scworld.com/news/how-the-fog-of-more-bogs-down-infosec-pros
7. Dynamis. (2025, September 26). SCENE Scenario Instructor Course [classroom course]. Calgary, AB Canada
8. Id.
This article by Matt Bloodgood has been submitted for publication in the International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association Winter 2025 journal.
